Friday, February 10, 2006

Arguments for a Dynamic Theory of Time (Part One)
God and Time

I blogged previously about theories of time, and how most philosophers of time believe that if the dynamic theory of time is true, God must be in time. Alternatively, if the static theory of time is true, then God must be outside of time.

So, which theory of time is correct? As promised previously, I will address this over a number of blog entries.

William Lane Craig details two main arguments in favour of a dynamic theory of time in his book Time and Eternity:
  • The ineliminability of tense
  • The presentness of experience
As the inelminability of tense argument is significant more complicated, we will leave that for another time, and focus for now on the presentness of experience.

The Presentness of Experience

This argument holds that a deep belief in the objective reality of past, present, and future is a universal part of human experience. In simple terms it claims that everyone experiences the difference between the past, present, and future, which the static theory of time denies. Everyone experiences the passage of time, and so we are justified in holding the objectivity of tense as true, unless a good reason is found not to.

The psychologist William Friedman says that “the division between past, present, and future so deeply permeates our experience that it is hard to imagine its absence.” He further claims that we have “an irresistible tendency to believe in a present. Most of us find quite startling the claim of some physicists and philosophers that the present has no special status in the physical world, that there is only a sequence of times, that the past, present, and future are only distinguishable in human consciousness.”

Consequently, it is claimed that our experience of tense ought to be accepted as true unless we are given some more powerful reason for rejecting it – i.e. The burden of proof is only those claiming that a dynamic theory of time is incorrect.

Craig claims that our belief in the reality of tense is much more fundamental than even that may suggest. He says “We do not adopt the belief in an objective difference between the past, present, and future in an attempt to explain our experience of the temporal world. Rather our belief in this case is what epistemologists call a 'properly basic belief'.”

A basic belief is a foundational belief formed in some circumstances that is not based on some other belief. Craig gives the example of looking out the window and form the belief that “there is a tree”. He says that he is definitely not reasoning, “I am receiving certain sensory stimuli such that a tree is appearing to me. The best explanation of this sensory phenomenon is that there really is a tree and that therefore I have having this experience.” Rather, he says, we just automatically and immediately form the belief that “there is a tree”.

A properly basic belief is a basic belief grounded in appropriate circumstances – i.e. It must be rational. A large proportion of our beliefs are properly basic beliefs.

Properly basic beliefs can of course be shown to be false, but we are justified in believing them until this is done. Craig gives the example of visiting Disney World and forming the belief “there is a tree”, which would be properly basic, until he discovers on close inspection that the “tree” is a simulation. At the point the belief has been defeated, and to remain rational, it must now be abandonned.

A properly basic belief may reasonably held as true unless and until it is defeated – the belief is justified prima facie. Take for example the properly basic belief that “the external world is real”. It is possible that the situation described in the move The Matrix is true – the world could be a simulation. In fact, there is no way to prove that hypothesis false, but that does not imply that you are not justified in believing in the external world. The mere possibility that the Matrix is true is no justification for abandoning the deeply held belief in the external world. Very strong evidence would be required to defeat the belief that the external world is real.

The belief in the past, present, and future is argued to be very similar. Belief in the objective reality of tense is a properly basic belief that is universal, and denying it without a good reason is irrational.

Craig formulates this argument as follows:
  1. Belief in the objective reality of the distinction between past, present, and future is properly basic.
  2. If our belief in the objective reality of the distinction between past, present, and future is properly basic, then we are prima facie justified in holding this belief.
  3. Therefore, we are prima facie justified in holding our belief in the objective reality of the distinction between past, present, and future.
Premise (2) is true by definition of a properly basic belief, and so the only disputable premise is (1).

Craig gives three main reasons for this argument, each of which we will look at in turn.

This reason is very simple: we experience events as present. Craig says that “our belief that events are happening presently is really no different than our belief that they are happening – and this latter belief is a basic belief grounded in our perceptual experience.” If we experience events as present, then this affirms the objective reality of the present.

Our Differential Attitudes toward Past and Future

This reason observes that we have different attitudes towards the past and future. Past events are remembered with nostalgia or regret, and future events are looked forward to with either dread or anticipation. We have different feelings about events depending on whether they are past or future.

As the late Oxord tense logician A.N. Prior once remarked, when we say, “Thank goodness that's over!” we certainly do not mean “Thank goodnes the date of that thing's conclusion is June 15, 1954!” Prior's point is that such attitudes cannot concern tenseless facts but are about tensed facts, and that further, it is entirely rational to have such attitudes. If it is rational for me to be relieved that my visit to the dentist is past, then my belief that my visit is past is also rational.

On the static theory of time, all such attitudes must be regarded as irrational, as there is no such thing as the past, present, or future.

The Experience of Temporal Becoming

The final feature of our temporal experience is our experience of temporal becoming as we experience the world in continuous flux. We experience in the mind a continual change in the contents of consciousness.

This becomes fairly obvious when considering certain experiences. For example, who hasn't wished that it were some other time? For example, a child may say, “I wish it were Christmas”. Although there is no chance of such a wish coming true, there is no mistaking what they mean by it. The intent is that they wish that Christmas were now. The intent is not to wish that Christmas ocurred on February 9 instead of December 25. In such experiences we are wishing that some other moment in time were present instead of now, thereby presupposing the reality of temporal becoming and an objective present.

Conclusion

It follows from the above argument that we are prima facie justified in holding a belief in the objective reality between past, present, and future. Even Mellor, a major supporter of the static theory of time, admits, “Tense is so striking an aspect of reality that only the most compelling argument justifies denying it: namely, that the tensed view of time is self-contradictory and so cannot be true.”

We will examine this potential contradiction, known as McTaggart's Paradox, at a later point. However, the conclusion thus far is that the dynamic theory of time must be correct, unless a compelling reason to reject it can be found.

There is an objective now – the flow of time is real.

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