In theological circles, fatalism is the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. It argues that if God foreknows what we will do, then we must do it so we cannot have free choice.
Consequently it seems that the one of either divine foreknowledge or human freedom must be dropped. I previously explained the argument for fatalism, and also examined why arguing that God is outside of time doesn't actually help resolve the problem.
To recap, the English philosopher Nelson Pike argued the following, assuming that there is a hypothetical individual called Jones, who on Saturday afternoon mows his lawn.
The only premise that is really available to deny is (6) by finding another alternative. We cannot deny (1) or (2) without saying that God is not omniscient. All the other premises are fairly simple logic and so cannot be denied (without serious problems).
So does an alternative escape route exist that allows us to deny premise (6)? I think there is.
(iv) Jones has the power to act differently, and were he to act differently, God would have foreknown that instead.
The problem with the argument for fatalism is that it is not logically coherent. It says that if God foreknows something then it must happen, whereas all we can conclude from that is that it will happen. Basically it says that we act in a certain because God foreknows it, rather than God foreknows what we will do because we will do it.
Fatalism argues:
2'. Necessarily, God foreknows x.
But that surely does not make sense. It means that God foreknew that a particular event would occur, and there was no possibility of him knowing differently. It means that this particular world is necessary. That means that God could not create the world any differently to how he did, and it also means that it could not have refrained from creation.
But hang on a moment. That does not make sense. It says that God was forced to create the world as he did, something that Christianity has always denied. God chose to create, but he could have chosen not to.
Fatalism cannot answer this. It cannot be reconciled with God's omnipotence. And fatalism does not show a contradiction between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Necessarily if God foreknows something then it will happen, but he foreknows things simply because they will happen. God foreknows that Jones will mow his lawn on Saturday not because Jones must mow it, but simply because he will know it. Jones certainly has the power to refrain from mowing, and he does refrain, God would simply have foreknown that instead.
Consequently it seems that the one of either divine foreknowledge or human freedom must be dropped. I previously explained the argument for fatalism, and also examined why arguing that God is outside of time doesn't actually help resolve the problem.
To recap, the English philosopher Nelson Pike argued the following, assuming that there is a hypothetical individual called Jones, who on Saturday afternoon mows his lawn.
- God's being omniscient implies that if Jones mows his lawn on Saturday afternoon, then God believed at an earlier time that Jones would mow his lawn on Saturday afternoon.
- Necessarily, all of God's beliefs are true.
- No one has the power to make a contradiction true.
- No one has the power to erase someone's past beliefs, that is, to bring it about that something believed in the past by someone was not believed in the past by that person.
- No one has the power to erase someone's existence in the past, that is, to bring it about that someone who did exist in the past did not exist in the past.
- So if God believed that Jones would mow his lawn on Saturday afternoon, Jones can refrain from mowing only if one of these conditions is true:
(i) Jones has the power to make God's belief false.
(ii) Jones has the power to erase God's past belief.
(iii) Jones has the power to erase God's past existence. - Alternative (i) is impossible. (This follows from steps 2 and 3).
- Alternative (ii) is impossible. (This follows from step 4).
- Alternative (iii) is impossible. (This follows from step 5).
- Therefore, if God believes that Jones will mow his lawn on Saturday afternoon, Jones does not have the power to refrain from mowing his lawn on Saturday afternoon.
The only premise that is really available to deny is (6) by finding another alternative. We cannot deny (1) or (2) without saying that God is not omniscient. All the other premises are fairly simple logic and so cannot be denied (without serious problems).
So does an alternative escape route exist that allows us to deny premise (6)? I think there is.
(iv) Jones has the power to act differently, and were he to act differently, God would have foreknown that instead.
The problem with the argument for fatalism is that it is not logically coherent. It says that if God foreknows something then it must happen, whereas all we can conclude from that is that it will happen. Basically it says that we act in a certain because God foreknows it, rather than God foreknows what we will do because we will do it.
Fatalism argues:
- Necessarily, any event that God foreknows will happen.
- God foreknows x.
- Therefore, necessarily x will happen.
- Necessarily, any event that God foreknows will happen.
- God foreknows x.
- Therefore, x will happen.
2'. Necessarily, God foreknows x.
But that surely does not make sense. It means that God foreknew that a particular event would occur, and there was no possibility of him knowing differently. It means that this particular world is necessary. That means that God could not create the world any differently to how he did, and it also means that it could not have refrained from creation.
But hang on a moment. That does not make sense. It says that God was forced to create the world as he did, something that Christianity has always denied. God chose to create, but he could have chosen not to.
Fatalism cannot answer this. It cannot be reconciled with God's omnipotence. And fatalism does not show a contradiction between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Necessarily if God foreknows something then it will happen, but he foreknows things simply because they will happen. God foreknows that Jones will mow his lawn on Saturday not because Jones must mow it, but simply because he will know it. Jones certainly has the power to refrain from mowing, and he does refrain, God would simply have foreknown that instead.
Comments
I agree. I think that I was groping towards something like tha in my previous posts.It's the difference between cause and effect.But I still think God can be outside of time :~)
Wow,
i absolutely loved your post, especially your thoughts at the end. Very interesting. I think this is an excellent case against foreknowledge meaning fatalism. I have found Open Theism interesting, but I agree that they error in joining Calvinistic thought about foreknowledge = predestination. Thanks very, very much. Blessings -John
I have a short story on God , Omniscience and Free Will at
http://stevencarrwork.blogspot.com/2005/09/god-omniscience-free-will-and.html
More relevant to the posting is the following, which illustrates why we can have free will , despite God's foreknowledge.
Consider these 2 sets of circumstances :-
1) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Sun 17/09/2006, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and God has infallible knowledge that I will choose tea.
2) I am sitting down to breakfast in an hotel at 8:30 am on Sun. 17/9/2006, and a waiter is asking me ‘Tea or Coffee’, and God has infallible knowledge that I will choose coffee.
There is a world where I freely choose coffee and a world where I freely choose tea. (Obviously, these are different worlds)
In the world where I freely choose coffee, by definition, I have freely chosen coffee.
In the world where I freely choose tea, by definition, I have freely chosen tea.
But which world is the actual world we live in? Is it the world where I freely choose coffee or the world where I freely choose tea?
This is part of what is known as Gods' 'free' knowledge.
He knows what will happen in each possible world, and decides which of those worlds is the actual world we live in.
Hi. Thanks for thinking. It's a treat to read.
Regarding 'Debunking Fatalism', I call your attention to Nelson Pike's logic. While I root for the conclusion, is there not a problem with point #1 in his syllogism?
Specifically, where it says that "God believed at an earlier time". Seems to me this is a fallacious thought which undermines the rest of the chain - even undermining it's conclusion.
My point: Biblically, God doesn't 'believe'. Certainly not in the sense of 'hoping' or 'having faith'. God 'believes' only in the sense of posessing certain or definite knowledge.
If indeed that is the case, then I'm not sure that Pike's argument really answers all that much re: the prolem of fatalism. It's more semantic than weighty. Ie: concluding point 10 -
" Therefore, if God knows with certainty (believes) that Jones will mow his lawn on Saturday afternoon, Jones does not have the power to refrain from mowing his lawn on Saturday afternoon."
How does this solve the problem of fatalism?
If you think I am missing the point re: God 'believing' in some other fashion, I'd like to hear it. Thanks
Hi. Thanks for thinking. It's a treat to read.
Regarding 'Debunking Fatalism', I call your attention to Nelson Pike's logic. While I root for the conclusion, is there not a problem with point #1 in his syllogism?
Specifically, where it says that "God believed at an earlier time". Seems to me this is a fallacious thought which undermines the rest of the chain - even undermining it's conclusion.
My point: Biblically, God doesn't 'believe'. Certainly not in the sense of 'hoping' or 'having faith'. God 'believes' only in the sense of posessing certain or definite knowledge.
If indeed that is the case, then I'm not sure that Pike's argument really answers all that much re: the prolem of fatalism. It's more semantic than weighty. Ie: concluding point 10 -
" Therefore, if God knows with certainty (believes) that Jones will mow his lawn on Saturday afternoon, Jones does not have the power to refrain from mowing his lawn on Saturday afternoon."
How does this solve the problem of fatalism?
If you think I am missing the point re: God 'believing' in some other fashion, I'd like to hear it. Thanks
i am now studying this argument for my thesis. i want to establish a firm argument in debunking fatalism by appeal to the existence and nature of God. i think this article will somehow help me... but i also think it is not enough...