I wrote previously about some limitations that could be made to the rules on urgency in Parliament, to try and slow down the pace of Parliament. The New Zealand Parliament passes a large number of laws at present, some of them ill-considered, and so slowly down the pace of legislation should improve it. In addition, it would mean that the Government couldn't use urgency to avoid question time at Parliament. Normally question time occurs at the start of every sitting day, but when the House moves into urgency, the same sitting day extends over multiple days, and so question time doesn't occur.
Anyway, that's not what I want to discuss now.
In theory the Speaker of the New Zealand House of Representatives is apolitical. They must be impartial even though they are generally still a member of the governing party. However, this does not always work so well in practice. Some of the rulings of the chair, particularly those to do with privileges, more often than not tend to favour the Government. The Speaker often does not have the respect of the Opposition, as it is in the interests of the Government to appoint who will be favourable for them.
In the New Zealand Parliament, the Speaker is chosen by members at the start of each Parliament (or whenever a vacancy occurs in the office), but remains a member of his/her political party. In addition, the Speaker votes normally during Parliament (although the vote is normally cast by the party whips), and so normally attends at least part of the party caucus meetings when policy is discussed (as their vote will be used for or against it). Prior to the standing orders changes in 1995, the Speaker did not normally cast a vote, except in the case of a tie. This was changed because the standing orders committee felt that the Speaker's constituency shouldn't be disadvantaged since because their MP was the Speaker. Under MMP they were worried that losing the Speaker's vote would change the proportionality of Parliament, which was rather important in an MMP election.
However, the result of this is that the office of the Speaker has become less independent. The Speaker is often not seen to be impartial, partially through decisions that really look partisan, but more particularly because the Opposition has no confidence in the person nominated.
A number of our Standing Orders and laws assume that the Speaker is independent though. For example:
In the British House of Commons, the indepdendence of the Speaker is considered very important. Consequently, the Speaker must be nominated by at least 12 MPs, at least 3 of which must be from a different party to the candidate. The vote is then done by secret ballot, with an absolute majority required for victory.
After election, the Speaker severs all ties with their former political party. If they stand for re-election to Parliament, their political party is stated as "Speaker seeking re-election". If they are elevated to the House of Lords, they sit as a cross-bencher, not for their former party.
The Speaker never votes in the House except in the event of a tied vote, and even then, the way they vote is bound by convention.
There have been notable examples where the Speaker has challenged the Government about their conduct in the House and asserted their authority. The current Speaker, the Right Hon. Michael Martin, has happily rebuked Tony Blair a number of times for not answering questions properly. A previous Speaker, the Right Hon. (Baron) Bernard Weatherill, clashed with Margorat Thatcher particularly of the issue of the right of the House to be informed of new government policy before it was released to the media.
Our Speakers are no where near as independent.
So what changes could we make to increase their independence?
I have a few ideas, but am still undecided as to which is the best.
1) Create a rule stating that the Speaker cannot come from any party in Government, or any party in coalition with a Government party. An opposition Speaker is much more likely to be independent that a Government Speaker.
2) Require a 60% or 66% super-majority for the election of the Speaker. This would require greater cross party support and would prevent the election of those more likely to be partisan.
3) Require that a candidate for Speaker be nominated by a number of members, with at least two from the main opposition party (we have many more parties in Parliament than the UK, so need to state that it is not just from any party).
4) Require the Speaker to sever all ties with their former party as in the UK. The Government would simply have one less vote if they chose a Speaker from a government party - an incentive to select an Opposition Speaker. The Speaker would only vote in the case of a tie according to convention.
5) Require the Speaker to sever all ties with their former party, but also cause a by-election or vanancy on the list. Consequently you would have 121 MPs (ignoring the overhang), one of them as the Speaker who is not a member of any party, and only votes in the case of a tie according to convention (this has the advantage of not changing the proportionality of Parliament). If the Speaker either resigned or was removed from office, they would no longer be an MP.
Currently I think my preference is a combination of (2) and (4). A super-majority should be required to elect the Speaker, making it more a bi-partisan approach, and following that the Speaker should be completely independent of their former party.
However, these changes do not seem likely. The Government always likes to appoint one of its own as Speaker so things don't get too out of hand.
Anyway, that's not what I want to discuss now.
In theory the Speaker of the New Zealand House of Representatives is apolitical. They must be impartial even though they are generally still a member of the governing party. However, this does not always work so well in practice. Some of the rulings of the chair, particularly those to do with privileges, more often than not tend to favour the Government. The Speaker often does not have the respect of the Opposition, as it is in the interests of the Government to appoint who will be favourable for them.
In the New Zealand Parliament, the Speaker is chosen by members at the start of each Parliament (or whenever a vacancy occurs in the office), but remains a member of his/her political party. In addition, the Speaker votes normally during Parliament (although the vote is normally cast by the party whips), and so normally attends at least part of the party caucus meetings when policy is discussed (as their vote will be used for or against it). Prior to the standing orders changes in 1995, the Speaker did not normally cast a vote, except in the case of a tie. This was changed because the standing orders committee felt that the Speaker's constituency shouldn't be disadvantaged since because their MP was the Speaker. Under MMP they were worried that losing the Speaker's vote would change the proportionality of Parliament, which was rather important in an MMP election.
However, the result of this is that the office of the Speaker has become less independent. The Speaker is often not seen to be impartial, partially through decisions that really look partisan, but more particularly because the Opposition has no confidence in the person nominated.
A number of our Standing Orders and laws assume that the Speaker is independent though. For example:
- Control of the Parliament grounds is vested in the Speaker.
- The Speaker determines if a prima facie case of privilege exists and refers it to the privileges committee.
- The Speaker determines if a seat vacancy exists and notifies the registrar.
In the British House of Commons, the indepdendence of the Speaker is considered very important. Consequently, the Speaker must be nominated by at least 12 MPs, at least 3 of which must be from a different party to the candidate. The vote is then done by secret ballot, with an absolute majority required for victory.
After election, the Speaker severs all ties with their former political party. If they stand for re-election to Parliament, their political party is stated as "Speaker seeking re-election". If they are elevated to the House of Lords, they sit as a cross-bencher, not for their former party.
The Speaker never votes in the House except in the event of a tied vote, and even then, the way they vote is bound by convention.
There have been notable examples where the Speaker has challenged the Government about their conduct in the House and asserted their authority. The current Speaker, the Right Hon. Michael Martin, has happily rebuked Tony Blair a number of times for not answering questions properly. A previous Speaker, the Right Hon. (Baron) Bernard Weatherill, clashed with Margorat Thatcher particularly of the issue of the right of the House to be informed of new government policy before it was released to the media.
Our Speakers are no where near as independent.
So what changes could we make to increase their independence?
I have a few ideas, but am still undecided as to which is the best.
1) Create a rule stating that the Speaker cannot come from any party in Government, or any party in coalition with a Government party. An opposition Speaker is much more likely to be independent that a Government Speaker.
2) Require a 60% or 66% super-majority for the election of the Speaker. This would require greater cross party support and would prevent the election of those more likely to be partisan.
3) Require that a candidate for Speaker be nominated by a number of members, with at least two from the main opposition party (we have many more parties in Parliament than the UK, so need to state that it is not just from any party).
4) Require the Speaker to sever all ties with their former party as in the UK. The Government would simply have one less vote if they chose a Speaker from a government party - an incentive to select an Opposition Speaker. The Speaker would only vote in the case of a tie according to convention.
5) Require the Speaker to sever all ties with their former party, but also cause a by-election or vanancy on the list. Consequently you would have 121 MPs (ignoring the overhang), one of them as the Speaker who is not a member of any party, and only votes in the case of a tie according to convention (this has the advantage of not changing the proportionality of Parliament). If the Speaker either resigned or was removed from office, they would no longer be an MP.
Currently I think my preference is a combination of (2) and (4). A super-majority should be required to elect the Speaker, making it more a bi-partisan approach, and following that the Speaker should be completely independent of their former party.
However, these changes do not seem likely. The Government always likes to appoint one of its own as Speaker so things don't get too out of hand.
Comments
I've previously written a proposal to amend the Constitution Act 1986 so that the Speaker is elected by a 75% majority majority of the house; which of course would mean that the government would be forced to put forth a non-partisan candidate.