Some time ago, Allan wrote several articles seeming about a book that was seeming to advocate Open Theism. In reply I wrote a quick post presenting some of the evidence for God being omniscient, and subsequently pointed out that if Open Theism is true, then God must be in time.
But I think it is now time to tackle Open Theism properly.
Open Theism is the view that God is not omniscient in the way that we normally think of it. It claims that the future is open and unsettled, so God does not know what will happen. According to Open Theism, God knows all past and present events. He can settle what he wants to in the future, can make logical guesses about other things, but does not know the rest - i.e. most of the future is unknown to God.
The argument for Open Theism is made up of several points:
Firstly, Open Theism argues that if humans are free to make their own decisions, the future must not be settled yet. It says that if we really have a free choice about a decision, the obviously that decision cannot have been made yet, and the future cannot be settled. If God already knows what the future is, then there is no decision to make, and therefore no human freedom.
Secondly, it argues that none the biblical passages used to support God's foreknowledge actually claim that God has exhaustive knowledge of the future. They are generally focused on particular events. Open Theism has no problem saying that God can settle (and therefore foreknow) some of the future, and so claims that these scriptures should be limited specifically to the events they describe.
Thirdly, Open Theism points to a number of biblical passages that seem to to indicate that God doesn't know what will happen in the future, changes his mind, speaks in conditionals about the future, or expresses regret about some things that have happened. This means that God cannot have know for certain what will happen or else these passages cannot be understood.
So let's examine these and see if the arguments stand up to scrutiny.
The first part of the argument is the dilemma of fatalism. It is simply saying that there is a contradiciton between God's foreknowledge and human freedom, and so consequently one must be denied.
Open Theism therefore denies God's foreknowledge (except under limited circumstances where God can settle some parts of the future). However, we have already seen that the argument for fatalism is in fact logically flawed, and that there is no contradiction between God's foreknowledge and human freedom. Consequently, this argument for Open Theism falls over.
It goes a little further than that though. Once fatalism has been debunked, the whole reason for Open Theism really disappears. It no longer solves any problem, and so consequently the remaining arguments for it would have to be very convincing in order for it to prevail.
The second argument for Open Theism is not really a positive argument, but trying to reduce the arguments against it. As even one of its main proponents, Gregory A. Boyd, points out, there is a prima facie case that God's foreknowledge is exhaustive. He needs to dismantle this prima facie case to prove his point.
I do not think he is successful for two reasons.
First of all, there are a number of passages that definately point towards God's exhaustive foreknowledge. I have described them previously both in my brief post on omniscience, and my longer article on predestination. However, just to cover a few quickly:
But that does not make sense. Suppose the following past tense statement is true (which it is - go the Hurricanes!):
If this statement is true, then prior to 24 March, the following future tense would have expressed a true proposition:
Boyd would have to claim that (P') is actually neither true nor false. But what then if I made that statement (P') along with the following statement:
According to Boyd, both (P') and (P'') are neither true nor false. But hang on, they are contradictory statements. One of them must be true, and one must be false. If (P') is false, then (P'') must be true. But Open Theism claims that this is not the case. Consequently, I don't think that it is logical.
But let's press on further. Open Theism argues that the biblical passages that talk about God's foreknowledge of the future are simply instances where God has settled what will happen. That also runs into problems. In Mt 26:34 Jesus says to Peter that before the cock crows, he will deny Jesus three times. Open Theism explains this that this is an example of God restricting Peter's freedom as he has settled part of the future.
This causes serious problems. One of the main arguments for Open Theism is that if God foreknows the future, human freedom is limited. But here, Open Theism has to argue that God has predetermined some things and eliminated human freedom in some circumstances. Basically, it has to invoke full-blown Calvinism to solve its problem with the foreknowledge scriptures.
So, how do I know that my actions are truly free? What if God has settled what I am going to do? If that is the case, Open Theism, which claimed to give human freedom, has just denied it to me entirely.
Consequently, the second argument for Open Theism, is both incoherent, as it breaks rules of logic, and even if true, means that human freedom is severely curtailed - exactly what it is trying to avoid.
The third argument for Open Theism was to do with those scriptures that imply that God changes his mind, doesn't know the future, or expresses regret as to how things turned out. The first thing to point here is that all of these passages are anthropomorphical to some extent, which can explain why they are written the way they are.
Let's look at a couple of examples that are put forward in support of this.
Firstly, in Isaiah 5:4 God is said to have expected his vineyard to produce domesticated grapes when it actually produced wild grapes. Boyd says that the "face" reading of this is the God was not sure what would happen until the Israelites settled it by becoming the "wild grapes".
However, I don't there is a single "face" reading of this passage. The statement "I expect things to go this way" can express my beliefs about the future, or announce my standards for future behaviour (for example, "I expect you to be on your best behaviour"). This passage does not imply God's foreknowledge is limited, but that the Israelites behaviour failed to live up to his expectations.
Boyd also cites Jeremiah 19:5 where the Lord is surprised that Israel would do things "which I did not command or decree, nor did it enter my mind". But this can be easily explained. David Hunt gives the example of a teacher, who on finding out that there best student has cheated on a test exclaims "I can't believe it!" This is not an exclaimation of ignorance - it's a disbelief that's possible even when all the facts are known.
David Hunt further points out Boyd's passages can be brought against him, since they can implicate God in various mistaken beliefs if Boyd's interpretation is adopted. Boyd tries to escape this by arguing that these are probability estimates based on the information available to God. Specifically this problem occurs in Jeremiah 3:7 where God says "I thought that after she had done all this she would return to me, but she did not".
Boyd is arguing that this passage attributes a belief like this to God:
Boyd must deny that the passage attributes this belief to God:
This is completely implausible and fatal to the argument for Open Theism.
So the arguments for Open Theism all fall down, but that is not a bad thing. The main premise for Open Theism was that it was needed to solve the problem of human freedom. But as we have seen, this is not necessary. Divine foreknowledge and human freedom and not incompatible, so we do need to redefine God's knowledge.
So how should God's foreknowledge best be described? We'll look at that in the near future.
But I think it is now time to tackle Open Theism properly.
Open Theism is the view that God is not omniscient in the way that we normally think of it. It claims that the future is open and unsettled, so God does not know what will happen. According to Open Theism, God knows all past and present events. He can settle what he wants to in the future, can make logical guesses about other things, but does not know the rest - i.e. most of the future is unknown to God.
The argument for Open Theism is made up of several points:
Firstly, Open Theism argues that if humans are free to make their own decisions, the future must not be settled yet. It says that if we really have a free choice about a decision, the obviously that decision cannot have been made yet, and the future cannot be settled. If God already knows what the future is, then there is no decision to make, and therefore no human freedom.
Secondly, it argues that none the biblical passages used to support God's foreknowledge actually claim that God has exhaustive knowledge of the future. They are generally focused on particular events. Open Theism has no problem saying that God can settle (and therefore foreknow) some of the future, and so claims that these scriptures should be limited specifically to the events they describe.
Thirdly, Open Theism points to a number of biblical passages that seem to to indicate that God doesn't know what will happen in the future, changes his mind, speaks in conditionals about the future, or expresses regret about some things that have happened. This means that God cannot have know for certain what will happen or else these passages cannot be understood.
So let's examine these and see if the arguments stand up to scrutiny.
The first part of the argument is the dilemma of fatalism. It is simply saying that there is a contradiciton between God's foreknowledge and human freedom, and so consequently one must be denied.
Open Theism therefore denies God's foreknowledge (except under limited circumstances where God can settle some parts of the future). However, we have already seen that the argument for fatalism is in fact logically flawed, and that there is no contradiction between God's foreknowledge and human freedom. Consequently, this argument for Open Theism falls over.
It goes a little further than that though. Once fatalism has been debunked, the whole reason for Open Theism really disappears. It no longer solves any problem, and so consequently the remaining arguments for it would have to be very convincing in order for it to prevail.
The second argument for Open Theism is not really a positive argument, but trying to reduce the arguments against it. As even one of its main proponents, Gregory A. Boyd, points out, there is a prima facie case that God's foreknowledge is exhaustive. He needs to dismantle this prima facie case to prove his point.
I do not think he is successful for two reasons.
First of all, there are a number of passages that definately point towards God's exhaustive foreknowledge. I have described them previously both in my brief post on omniscience, and my longer article on predestination. However, just to cover a few quickly:
- John says that "For God is greater than our heats and he knows everything." (1 Jn 3:20)
- The writer of Hebrews says that "Nothing in all creation is hidden from God's sight. Everything is uncovered and laid before the eyes of him to whom we must give account." (Heb 4:13 c.f. 2 Ch 16:9)
- God said to Isaiah "for I am God, and there is no other; I am God, and there is no one like me, declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done" (Is 46:9-10 c.f. Is 42:8-9)
- Psalm 139 - all of it, but in particular: "How precious to me are your thoughts, O God! How vast is the sum of them! Were I to count them, they would outnumber the grains of sand." (vv. 17-18) "All the days ordainded for me were written in your book before one of them came to be." (v. 16)
- And we know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose. For those God foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the likeness of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those he predestined, he also called; those he called, he also justified; those he justified, he also glorified. (Rom 8:28-30)
But that does not make sense. Suppose the following past tense statement is true (which it is - go the Hurricanes!):
(P) The Hurricanes won their 2006 Super 14 game against the Sharks on Friday 24 March.
If this statement is true, then prior to 24 March, the following future tense would have expressed a true proposition:
(P') The Hurricanes will win their 2006 Super 14 game against the Sharks on Friday 24 March.
Boyd would have to claim that (P') is actually neither true nor false. But what then if I made that statement (P') along with the following statement:
(P'')The Hurricanes will not win their 2006 Super 14 game against the Sharks on Friday 24 March.
According to Boyd, both (P') and (P'') are neither true nor false. But hang on, they are contradictory statements. One of them must be true, and one must be false. If (P') is false, then (P'') must be true. But Open Theism claims that this is not the case. Consequently, I don't think that it is logical.
But let's press on further. Open Theism argues that the biblical passages that talk about God's foreknowledge of the future are simply instances where God has settled what will happen. That also runs into problems. In Mt 26:34 Jesus says to Peter that before the cock crows, he will deny Jesus three times. Open Theism explains this that this is an example of God restricting Peter's freedom as he has settled part of the future.
This causes serious problems. One of the main arguments for Open Theism is that if God foreknows the future, human freedom is limited. But here, Open Theism has to argue that God has predetermined some things and eliminated human freedom in some circumstances. Basically, it has to invoke full-blown Calvinism to solve its problem with the foreknowledge scriptures.
So, how do I know that my actions are truly free? What if God has settled what I am going to do? If that is the case, Open Theism, which claimed to give human freedom, has just denied it to me entirely.
Consequently, the second argument for Open Theism, is both incoherent, as it breaks rules of logic, and even if true, means that human freedom is severely curtailed - exactly what it is trying to avoid.
The third argument for Open Theism was to do with those scriptures that imply that God changes his mind, doesn't know the future, or expresses regret as to how things turned out. The first thing to point here is that all of these passages are anthropomorphical to some extent, which can explain why they are written the way they are.
Let's look at a couple of examples that are put forward in support of this.
Firstly, in Isaiah 5:4 God is said to have expected his vineyard to produce domesticated grapes when it actually produced wild grapes. Boyd says that the "face" reading of this is the God was not sure what would happen until the Israelites settled it by becoming the "wild grapes".
However, I don't there is a single "face" reading of this passage. The statement "I expect things to go this way" can express my beliefs about the future, or announce my standards for future behaviour (for example, "I expect you to be on your best behaviour"). This passage does not imply God's foreknowledge is limited, but that the Israelites behaviour failed to live up to his expectations.
Boyd also cites Jeremiah 19:5 where the Lord is surprised that Israel would do things "which I did not command or decree, nor did it enter my mind". But this can be easily explained. David Hunt gives the example of a teacher, who on finding out that there best student has cheated on a test exclaims "I can't believe it!" This is not an exclaimation of ignorance - it's a disbelief that's possible even when all the facts are known.
David Hunt further points out Boyd's passages can be brought against him, since they can implicate God in various mistaken beliefs if Boyd's interpretation is adopted. Boyd tries to escape this by arguing that these are probability estimates based on the information available to God. Specifically this problem occurs in Jeremiah 3:7 where God says "I thought that after she had done all this she would return to me, but she did not".
Boyd is arguing that this passage attributes a belief like this to God:
(i) The probability that Israel will return to me, given how matters now stand, is greater than 0.5.
Boyd must deny that the passage attributes this belief to God:
(ii) Israel will return to me.
This is completely implausible and fatal to the argument for Open Theism.
So the arguments for Open Theism all fall down, but that is not a bad thing. The main premise for Open Theism was that it was needed to solve the problem of human freedom. But as we have seen, this is not necessary. Divine foreknowledge and human freedom and not incompatible, so we do need to redefine God's knowledge.
So how should God's foreknowledge best be described? We'll look at that in the near future.
Comments
Can you describe in further detail what you mean by the "beliefs being attributed to God" according to Boyd in the Jeremiah 3:7 passage, on this post: http://www.cloudsofheaven.org/2006/03/problems-with-open-theism.html
I'm not sure I understand how to apply what you have said in order to see that Boyd's attributes are "completely implausible and fatal to the argument for Open Theism." I do not disagree with you, I just have not been able to argue against the Open Theist's view or assertion for this verse. I think that there is something to what you have said but no matter how many times I read it I can not arrive at a "point". Hopefully I'm able to get an answer with this. Thank You, Sam.
Just to say ahead of time, I generally agree with you though I have made no firm decision on the nature of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. It is enough for me that the Bible teaches that they both exist and that we have record and personal experience of both. I did want to comment on open theism having to resort to calvinism. I do not believe that is necessary. There is a difference between being absolutely certain something will happen and just knowing it ahead of time. God knows our hearts and minds thoroughly and also can calculate with exactness the actions of human beings as well as the outcome of physical happenings via cause and effect. Peter may have been obviously crumbling in his resolve and the other people would have been on the look out for disciples. Since it is not necessary that the crow have freedom, that could have been forced. I think the main problem with the open theism view is not that they say future actions cannot be known (known as in a given, not known as in something that was figured out), but that they don't stress enough the reasoning capabilities of God. Generally, I am of the mind that God's knowing (if it is in fact exhaustive and definite) is a result of our future action and therefore does not compromise our freedom in making the action. Our action supplies God's knowledge, not the other way around. But I do have to wonder really, what kind of life is it to never be surprised. It's like it's already all over for God, even though techincally it will never end. Unless of course he just chooses to shut it away in a closet in his mind until he needs it, cause since he knows what's going to happen he can just keep on doing whatever he wants because he knows with certainty that it will match the record in that closet. In which case, it would be perfectly possible for God to be surprised. There are lots of things I know that I do not access constantly. I have not however, heard an argument in favor of God possessing the knowledge, but limiting his use of it.