Lewis has been talking a bit recently about constructive votes of confidence, particularly when appointing a Prime Minister. At present, the first opportunity the House has to vote down a government is at the end of the Address in Reply debate, held immediately after the Speech from the Throne. This means that a government is generally in office for around 3-4 weeks before the vote is held.
The Governor-General appoints the Prime Minister who appears to have the confidence of the House, but must make that appointment before the House meets. Now this generally isn't a problem, because the various party leaders have indicated who they support, so the Governor-General has a clear decision. Before the first MMP election, the sitting Governor-General, the Right Honourable Sir Michael Hardie-Boys made a speech indicating that in the event of an unclear election result, he would wait for the party leaders to indicate their intentions publicly.
The question is though, should the Governor-General even be making this decision in the first place? Lewis thinks not, and I tend to agree with him.
Firstly, it points the Governor-General in a difficult position, where they are still taking advice from the caretaker Prime Minister, yet must decide who is the next Prime Minister. I agree that the decision really should rest with Parliament itself, via some sort of investiture vote, like that of the Parliament of Ireland.
Parliament itself should advise the Governor-General (via an Address) who to appoint as Prime Minister. Furthermore, Parliament should be required to sit much closer to the date of the election. At present, Parliament must sit within 6 weeks of the return of the writs (generally 8 weeks after the election).
Lewis puts forward the late Rod Donald's Constitution (Confidence Votes) Amendment Bill as an example of what we could do. While I agree with part of this, I disagree with another part of it, which requires a constructive vote of no-confidence to remove a government from office. This means that a motion of no-confidence must state a proposal for an alternative government to be formed from within the existing Parliament.
I disagree with this. It is quite plausible that a coalition breakup could result in a Parliament too fragmented to continue to function, and it seems to me to be unacceptable that a Government could have lost the confidence of the House, but continue to function because no alternative government could be found.keygen quark
The Governor-General appoints the Prime Minister who appears to have the confidence of the House, but must make that appointment before the House meets. Now this generally isn't a problem, because the various party leaders have indicated who they support, so the Governor-General has a clear decision. Before the first MMP election, the sitting Governor-General, the Right Honourable Sir Michael Hardie-Boys made a speech indicating that in the event of an unclear election result, he would wait for the party leaders to indicate their intentions publicly.
The question is though, should the Governor-General even be making this decision in the first place? Lewis thinks not, and I tend to agree with him.
Firstly, it points the Governor-General in a difficult position, where they are still taking advice from the caretaker Prime Minister, yet must decide who is the next Prime Minister. I agree that the decision really should rest with Parliament itself, via some sort of investiture vote, like that of the Parliament of Ireland.
Parliament itself should advise the Governor-General (via an Address) who to appoint as Prime Minister. Furthermore, Parliament should be required to sit much closer to the date of the election. At present, Parliament must sit within 6 weeks of the return of the writs (generally 8 weeks after the election).
Lewis puts forward the late Rod Donald's Constitution (Confidence Votes) Amendment Bill as an example of what we could do. While I agree with part of this, I disagree with another part of it, which requires a constructive vote of no-confidence to remove a government from office. This means that a motion of no-confidence must state a proposal for an alternative government to be formed from within the existing Parliament.
I disagree with this. It is quite plausible that a coalition breakup could result in a Parliament too fragmented to continue to function, and it seems to me to be unacceptable that a Government could have lost the confidence of the House, but continue to function because no alternative government could be found.keygen quark
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